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Abstract. What are the proper objects of perception? Two famous responses
to this question hold that they are either the images of extramental objects,
that is, the way in which they appear to us (representationalism), or they are
the objects themselves (direct realism). In this paper, I present an analysis of
this issue by Abū l-Barakāt al-Baġdādī (d. 1164/65), a post-Avicennian scholar
whose impact on the history of Islamic philosophy has been largely neglected.
Abū l-Barakāt argued against the traditional Aristotelian-Avicennian episte-
mological dualism, which distinguishes between the sense-perception of ma-
terial particulars and the conception of immaterial universals in terms of the
perceiver and/or the structure of perception. In Abū l-Barakāt’s own theory,
all epistemic acts have the unified structure of direct relation between one and
the same perceiver (immaterial soul) and the objects themselves – both ma-
terial and immaterial. His main thesis is that having corporeal organs is not
necessary for sense-perception. In the final section of the paper, I show that Abū
l-Barakāt’s critique of the Aristotelian-Avicennian tradition was received as a
breakthrough in epistemology. It may have also determined the epistemologi-
cal theories of two of the most important post-Avicennian Islamic philosophers:
Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1210) and Šihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī (d. 1191).
Résumé. Quels sont les objets de la perception ? Deux réponses célèbres à
cette question soutiennent que ce sont soit les images des objets extramen-
taux, c’est-à-dire la façon dont ils nous apparaissent (représentationalisme),
soit les objets eux-mêmes (réalisme direct). Dans cet article, je présente une
analyse de cette question par Abū l-Barakāt al-Baġdādī (m. 1164/65), un sa-
vant post-avicennien dont l’impact sur l’histoire de la philosophie islamique a
été largement négligé. Abū l-Barakāt s’est opposé au dualisme épistémologique
traditionnel aristotélicien-avicennien, qui établit une distinction entre la per-
ception sensorielle des particuliers matériels et la conception des universaux
immatériels, notamment en ce qui concerne le percevant et/ou la structure de
la perception. Selon la théorie d’Abū l-Barakāt, tous les actes épistémiques ont
la structure unifiée d’une relation directe entre un même percevant (l’âme im-
matérielle) et les objets eux-mêmes – matériels et immatériels. Sa thèse princi-
pale consiste à dire qu’avoir des organes corporels n’est pas nécessaire pour la
perception sensorielle. Dans la dernière section de cet article, je montre que la
critique d’Abū l-Barakāt de la tradition aristotélicienne-avicennienne fut consi-
dérée comme une innovation révolutionnaire en épistémologie. Cela peut avoir
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déterminé les théories épistémologiques de deux des philosophes arabes post-
avicenniens les plus importants : Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (m. 1210) et Šihāb al-Dīn
al-Suhrawardī (m. 1191).
INTRODUCTION
Among the many tasks of epistemology is formulating a response
to the question of the proper objects of our sense-perception, cognition,
imagination, and other mental activities. One common response to this
question is the claim that the proper objects of such activities are images
(broadly speaking). These images may either be representations of real
objects outside our minds or stand as our own independent phantasies.
When I see a red apple, what I see is in fact the image “red apple”: the red
apple as it appears to me. Such an image may be corporeal or incorporeal
or both – depending on our philosophy of mind and the mental activity
in question. The core idea is that the object of perception1 belongs to
me. Someone else may simultaneously imagine “blue apple” instead of
the red one. This theory is commonly referred to as representationalism.
One opposing view holds that I perceive the red apple itself. That is, I
perceive the extramental object as such. Mediation between the subject
and the object of perception through mental entities and sense-organs
becomes irrelevant in this theory. Another person may perceive abso-
lutely the same red apple as I do. This is the core tenet of the episte-
mological position called direct realism. In addition to these positions,
a third option presents itself, thanks to the work of Franz Brentano. I
would situate this position between the other two. On the one hand, the
proper object of perception is an image, such as “red apple”. On the other
hand, the pieces of information, such as “redness” and “being an apple”,
are said not of this image but of the red apple itself. This is because the
representative image “red apple” is intentionally directed towards the
apple itself. This position may be called intentionalism.
It has become custom in the history of philosophy to inquire whether
a given philosopher was a representationalist or direct realist and to
consider what his stance on intentionality was. Among the vast scholar-
ship on Aristotle’s epistemology, it appears that every imaginable posi-
tion has been ascribed to Aristotle. The dominant view in contemporary
scholarship seems to hold that Aristotle was a direct realist. This view
opposes previous interpretations that described Aristotle rather as an
1 Throughout the paper I use the notion of perception in a broad sense of a cognitive
act of any type in general, and not just sense-perception.
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intentionalist2. Indeed, much of the ancient and medieval Aristotelian
tradition attributed to Aristotle what we would today call a “theory of
intentionality” and ascribed to this view themselves. To this tradition be-
longs, for instance, John Philoponus and Averroes, as well as – accord-
ing to some interpreters – Avicenna3. Regarding the medieval period,
debates rage in the scholarship over the question of whether Thomas
Aquinas was a representationalist (or rather intentionalist) or direct re-
alist4.
It has been largely ignored, however that, half a century earlier than
Thomas, in the eastern part of the Arabic speaking world, a debate oc-
curred that closely resembled the contest of representationalism and di-
rect realism. The central figure of this debate was Abū l-Barakāt al-
Baġdādī (d. 1164/65), a Jewish scholar, who wrote in Arabic and who al-
legedly converted to Islam. Shlomo Pines and Jari Kaukua note in their
studies of Abū l-Barakāt’s psychology that he refutes the traditional
Aristotelian-Avicennian doctrine of the powers or the faculties (δυνάμεις
/ quwā) of soul. Instead he insists on the importance of the concept of a
“self” that is identical to the immaterial soul. It is this “self”, rather than
a faculty of soul that dwells in a sense-organ, that is the proper subject
of any kind of perception5.
In this paper, I will focus on the epistemological background of Abū
2 Most famous is the discussion of Aristotle’s epistemology that occurred between Put-
nam, Nussbaum, Burnyeat, and Sorabji. It can be found in Martha Nussbaum and
Amélie Rorty, Essays on Aristotle’s “De anima” (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992). See
also Christof Rapp, “Intentionalität und Phantasia bei Aristoteles”, in Dominik Per-
ler (ed.), Ancient and medieval theories of intentionality (Leiden-Boston-Köln: Brill,
2001), p. 63-95, and Victor Caston, “Aristotle and the problem of intentionality”,
Philosophy and phenomenological research, 58, 1998, p. 248-298.
3 Cf. Richard Sorabji, “From Aristotle to Brentano: The development of the concept of
intentionality”, Oxford studies in ancient philosophy, suppl. vol. 1991 “Aristotle and
the later tradition”, p. 227-259. On intentionality in Avicenna see Deborah Black,
“Intentionality in medieval Arabic philosophy”, Quaestio, 10 (2010), p. 65-81, Jari
Kaukua, Avicenna on subjectivity: A philosophical study, PhD thesis (Jyväskylä Uni-
versity, 2007), and id., “The problem of intentionality in Avicenna”, Documenti e
studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale, 25 (2014), p. 215-242.
4 Cf. Robert Pasnau, Theories of cognition in the later middle Ages (Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1997), and Dominik Perler, Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter
(Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann Verlag, 2002), p. 80-89.
5 Shlomo Pines, “La conception de la conscience de soi chez Avicenne et chez Abu’l-
Barakāt al-Baghdādī’s Poetics and Metaphysics”, Archives d’histoire doctrinale et
littéraire du Moyen Âge, 21 (1954), p. 21-98; Jari Kaukua, “Self, agent, soul: Abū
l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī’s critical reception of Avicennian psychology”, in J. Kaukua
and T. Ekenberg (ed.), Subjectivity and selfhood in medieval and early modern phi-
losophy (Springer, 2016), p. 75-89.
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l-Barakāt’s reformulation of Aristotelian-Avicennian psychology. I will
show that, in conjunction with some traditional arguments against rep-
resentationalism, this psychology leads Abū l-Barakāt to accept a form
of direct realism, which for the purposes of this paper I will call here “uni-
fied direct realism,” and to dismiss any kind of epistemological dualism
between conceptual understanding and sense-perception. In his view,
one and the same immaterial soul – the first-person subject of percep-
tion – directly perceives both universal concepts and sensible particulars
through the same epistemic procedure. As a result, Abū l-Barakāt sug-
gests that, contrary to the tenets of the Avicennian tradition, one can in
fact cognise sensible particulars without having recourse to the senses
of the body, just as one can directly cognise intelligibles.
In this essay I will make the following points concerning Abū l-
Barakāt’s “unified direct realism.” In the first section, I will articulate
Abū l-Barakāt’s account of the rival view, representationalism. Then
I will address two main lines of his counterargument. The first line
(section two) focuses on the character of the proper objects of perception
and appeals to traditional arguments grounded in the perception of
distances and magnitudes. The second line (section three) identifies the
proper subject of perception, the “self.” This is where psychology meets
epistemology and the refutation of the faculties of the soul plays a cen-
tral role. In section four, I will ask how historically fair Abū l-Barakāt’s
criticism was and explain how his direct realism is intended to differ
from the Aristotelian or Avicennian formulation of that position. In
the fifth section, I will summarise Abū l-Barakāt’s own doctrine and
briefly speculate on how his unified direct realism might work. Finally,
in conclusion, I will briefly show that Abū l-Barakāt’s contemporaries
explicitly acknowledged his importance for the history of epistemology
in the Islamic world. I will hypothetically suggest that the most impor-
tant philosophers of the twelfth century based their epistemologies on
Abū l-Barakāt’s “unified direct realism.”
1. ABŪ L-BARAKĀT’S RIVAL: REPRESENTATIONALISM
The discussion of the proper objects and subjects of psychic and men-
tal activities forms the core (more than 70 %) of the De anima section of
The reconsidered, Abū l-Barakāt’s magnum opus6. In this section, Abū
6 As Pines has put it, Kitāb al-muʿtabar literally means Le livre de ce qui a été établi
par réflexion personnelle (Shlomo Pines, “Nouvelles études sur Awḥad al-Zamân
Abū-l-Barakât al-Baghdâdî”, Paris, Durlacher, 1955). I decided that this intention
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l-Barakāt discusses all of the views that have come down to him, such
as extramissionist and intromissionist positions concerning the problem
of vision, or different divisions and assignments of internal and exter-
nal sense-faculties and sense-organs. Without explicating his analysis
of every view presented, it suffices to say that Abū l-Barakāt focuses
most extensively on a constellation of recurring notions and ideas that
he finds particularly objectionable.
First, according to his reconstructions of their positions, Abū l-
Barakāt’s predecessors frequently appeal to “resemblances” that occur
to a sense-organ or sense-faculty of the perceiver (mudrik) when he or
she perceives some extramental object. The notions for these resem-
blances are derivatives of the Arabic root m-ṯ-l which literally means
something like “being similar” and “resemble” (II.308.3). So, whenever
we perceive something, there is a miṯāl (“resemblance” or “image”).
Alternative terms may be found, for instance, in Abū l-Barakāt’s pre-
sentation of the intromissionist theory of vision: šabaḥ (“figure”), ḫayāl
(“imaginative object”) and often ṣūra (“form”) (II.324.5-6; II.333.8).
These “images” perform a certain action: they occur (ḥaṣala) in a
sense-faculty or in a sense-organ (II.311.24). Further, in The reconsid-
ered, we can find the traditional Aristotelian division between outer
(ḫāriǧa) and inner (bāṭina) senses. Abū l-Barakāt’s summarising report
contains the following notions that are traceable to Avicenna’s famous
revision of inner and outer senses: vision, hearing, touch, smell and
taste for outer senses, and common sense, imagination (i.e. taḫayyul),
estimation, and memory for inner senses7 (II.323-24; II.340-41). Al-
though Abū l-Barakāt recognises different inner senses, he does not
seem to see any important difference between them and usually analyses
them altogether as the senses of the brain. Thus, images in perception
primarily occur either in the outer sense-organs, as for instance, when
I touch the table and the sense of touch occurs in my hand, or in the
brain, as when I imagine myself touching the table. Nevertheless, the
may be best rendered as The reconsidered, given that reconsideration usually implies
careful analysis. Through this translation, I intend the idea that Abū l-Barakāt re-
vises the idea of others. In what follows, I will refer to the volume, pages and line
numbers of Yaltkaya’s edition (Abū l-Barakāt al-Baġdādī, Kitāb al-muʿtabar, ed.
Şerefeddin Yaltkaya, 3 vol., Hyderabad, 1938) without mentioning the title.
7 On Avicenna’s theory of internal and external senses see Deborah Black, “Imagi-
nation and estimation: Arabic paradigms and Western transformations”, Topoi, 19
(2000), p. 59-75, and Peter Pormann, “Avicenna on medical practice, epistemology,
and the physiology of the inner senses”, in P. Adamson, Interpreting Avicenna: Crit-
ical essays (Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 102-107.
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distinction between inner and outer senses does not play a role in Abū
l-Barakāt’s reconstruction of the rival position, as he recognises a pat-
tern common to both of them. In both cases, one says that the objects of
perception are imagined (tamaṯṯala), engraved (intaqaša fī), inscribed
(irtasama) or impressed (inṭabaʿa) in the corresponding sense-organ:
brain, hand, eye, etc. (outer senses: II.308.3; II.324.20; inner senses:
II.308.9; II.340.19; II.341.5).
Given these distinctions, the intromissionist theory of vision and the
theory of common-sense are presented as follows:
As for the objects of vision, some ancients said about them that we only
see them through the arrival of a figure, imaginative object, image, or a
form of the observed to [the observer]. They talked about it in various ways.
Whatever arrives [to the observer] does so by being impressed in the specific
organ of vision (II.324.5-7).
They say that this [activity] is [performed] by engraving figures and im-
ages having colours and shapes in the two front ventricles of the brain; or
rather in the spirit (al-rūḥ) that exists in them. That which perceives them
is a power that they call common sense (II.340.18-21).
So, any kind of perception – inner or outer – happens through the
occurrence of an image of the perceived object in the corresponding or-
gan. This however does not immediately entail representationalism. In-
deed, in neither passage does Abū l-Barakāt claim explicitly that the im-
printed images are the objects of perception themselves. The occurrence
of an image in the sense-organ may be merely a means for perception.
Neither direct realist nor intentionalist would deny this. The issue is,
however, clarified in the following passage:
One says in respect of each among these perceptions that the perceiver
“encounters” (yulāqā) the perceived and “talks” (yušāfihuhū) to it. The idea
that unifies [all accounts of perception] is an encounter between the per-
ceiver and the perceived, their coming together either by the perceiver or
by the perceived. Yet they have [also] explained vision on the basis of how
shapes having colours get engraved in surfaces, bodies, and mirrors, and
how qualities, such as heat and cold, migrate by being relocated from some
bodies to others. They said in respect of mental perceptions and imagina-
tive activities that they [amount to] grasping forms and imagining figures
in specific organs. These are the spirits which bear the powers [of soul].
They have however made an exception among these perceptions. It is that
which they called intellectual perception. It does not specifically belong to
any organ, nor does it require any organ. Whatever the perceiver encoun-
ters among [intelligibles], he perceives it through himself (bi-ḏātihī) and he
makes it occur in himself (fī ḏātihī). […] [325.9] According to these views,
whatever is perceived – especially in the case of mental perceptions – pri-
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marily and essentially is not that which is said to be perceived because its
meaning (maʿnā) and image is imprinted [in the perceiver]. Rather it must
be the meaning and the image [themselves]. It is not verified how the pos-
sessor of the meaning is perceived through it, or [maybe the perception of
that object] is not verified at all (II.324.18 – 325.11).
This passage is central to Abū l-Barakāt’s account of the view under
attack. First, he collects all possible iterations of perception – both inner
and outer – under the notion of “encounter” between the subject and the
object of perception. With this, he does not have any qualms. Moreover,
we will see in the fifth section that the central point of Abū l-Barakāt
addresses this general notion of “encounter”. He does not, however, as-
sent to anything that is added to this notion. Here, we again find the
language of “engraving” an image in the sense-organ: both in the case of
inner and outer sense-perception. Towards the end of the passage, Abū
l-Barakāt finally charges his opponent with representationalism, as the
account under consideration entails that one does not perceive the object
itself. Yes, one does perceive the “meaning” and the “image” of an object,
but one does not perceive that to which this meaning and this image be-
long. The last sentence says that the proponent of the “images” cannot
articulate how the perception of images entails the perception of extra-
mental objects, nor is it possible to verify that there are those objects at
all. This point clarifies a central feature of representationalism. Repre-
sentationalism entails not only that perception happens through simu-
lacra of extramental objects, but also that these simulacra are the proper
objects of perception. Abū l-Barakāt notices that this must specifically
be the case for inner senses, which he here refers to as “mental percep-
tions.” In cases of mental perception, we definitely lack the proper object
of perception and only have recourse to an image.
Before we proceed to Abū l-Barakāt’s counter-arguments, I want to
draw attention to the exceptional case that Abū l-Barakāt mentions in
the passage: the perception of intelligibles. In this case, one does not re-
quire the impression of a form onto a sense-organ. Rather the perceiver
himself – that is, his immaterial soul – perceives intelligibles immedi-
ately and directly as occurring in himself. Abū l-Barakāt thus attributes
to his opponents an important distinction between conceptual under-
standing and sense-perception. This amounts to a certain brand of epis-
temological dualism, according to which the epistemic relation to uni-
versal concepts is different from that to sensible particulars. Concepts
belong to the space of our direct understanding, whereas material par-
ticulars do not. Rather the latter require some intermediary “image,”
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which would substitute for them in someone’s space of understanding
and “encountering” the objects of perceptions. I will return to this fun-
damental dualism in section five.
2. MAGNITUDES, DISTANCES, QUALITIES:
AGAINST REPRESENTATIONALISM
The position that Abū l-Barakāt ascribes to his opponents is repre-
sentationalist. It maintains that all objects of our perceptions are cer-
tain images, merely ways in which things appear to us. No perceptual
connection reaches the object of perception itself. Abū l-Barakāt does
not struggle to find grounds upon which to criticise this position. He ad-
dresses first the outer senses and then the inner senses.
Abū l-Barakāt’s analysis presents vision as the paradigm for the
outer senses. In the case of vision, the intromissionist position stands
for the general representationalist position concerning perception:
we see things through the reception of an image in our eyes. Abū l-
Barakāt’s main argument against this view appeals to the perception of
magnitudes:
The decisive proof against those who believe in figures that arrive [into
eyes] is for us to say: how can a pupil of eye or the spirit that is in it hold
the impression of the form of heavens in accordance with its largeness and
its magnitude, although [both] are much smaller than it? How can a large
form be impressed in a small one (II.327.23 – 328.1)?
Since antiquity, opponents of the intromissionist theory of vision
have appealed to this argument8. The problem is simple: if seeing
something entails having an impression in the eye of the seer how can
we account for seeing different magnitudes? Remember that this is a
representationalist theory of perception. What we see is the picture in
the eye and not the object itself. Given that we intuitively realise that
we see the magnitudes of things, these magnitudes must be ascribed to
the object of our perception. But the object of perception is a picture in
the eye. Thus, this picture must actually be as large as the seen object
itself. This is obviously problematic.
Abū l-Barakāt suggests a solution on behalf of his opponent. Perhaps
the act of perception divides the seen object into small particles (ǧuzʾan
ṣaġīran baʿd ǧuzʾ), such that each of them can fit into the eye. Whenever
we see something large, we rapidly see each of its small particles one by
8 Cf. Galen, On the doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato, ed. P. De Lacy (Berlin:
Akademie Verlag, 1978), VII, 7. 4-15.
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one. Yet, Abū l-Barakāt responds: how do we see the entire object at all,
rather than a series of particles? He imagines his opponent appealing to
the Avicennian theory of common sense. One famous argument for this
faculty notes that when it rains, we do not see every small drop falling.
Instead, we see lines of rain. A similar phenomenon occurs when some-
thing quickly moves in a circle. We see a circle instead of this object at
every discrete stage of its motion9. According to the theory under con-
sideration, the same would apply to the perception of every object. Our
common sense would aggregate the whole series of seen particles into
one large thing. Abū l-Barakāt responds that this appeal to the Avicen-
nian common sense does not solve the problem. Rather, it replaces it, for
we can similarly ask now how a large object can fit into the brain, which
is the sense-organ of the common-sense (II.328.2-23).
The apprehension of magnitudes is not the only problem for represen-
tationalists. Abū l-Barakāt argues that whenever we hear something,
we can also perceive how far the source of the noise is. If hearing ne-
cessitated an impression of the sound-wave in the ear (similar to a pic-
ture in the eye in the case of vision) this would be impossible. The noise
that occurs in the ear is always the same distance from us (II.334.4-11).
Abū l-Barakāt invokes the argument from distances in the case of vi-
sion as well. The impressionist position may hold that there is first an
impression in the eye and, subsequently, the transfer (naql) of this im-
age to the brain, where it is perceived by another faculty (II.337-38).
Here, Abū l-Barakāt protests: “Each of us knows with certainty that he
sees the remote in accordance with it remoteness and the close in accor-
dance with it closeness, everything in its place and not in the interior of
his brain (II.338.12-13).” In other words, if the objects of vision are rep-
resentations, regardless of whether perception manifests through their
occurrence in the eye or through their transfer to the brain, one cannot
account for knowledge of the locations of the real objects, since the places
of their representations are in parts of human body.
The idea that outer sense-perceptions must in any case be transferred
to the brain brings us to the problems connected with inner senses. The
common sense, for instance, resides in the brain, or rather in the spirit
(rūḥ) flowing through the brain. According to the opponents of Abū l-
Barakāt, all outer sense perceptions are gathered in the common sense,
like when I both hear and see something. This however entails that the
9 Cf. Avicenna, Healing, De anima I.5, 44.13-15 (quoted after Avicenna, Al-šifāʾ, Al-
nafs, ed. F. Rahman as Avicenna’s De anima being the psychological part of Kitāb
al-shifāʾ, London, Oxford University Press, 1959).
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problems concerning representationalism hold a fortiori for the common
sense:
[A] We say the same about [the common sense] as we said about visual
perception. There, one has denied that the shapes of anything having large
dimensions (al-maqādīr) would be inscribed [in the eye pupil] beholding its
dimensions. So, how can thousands of such dimensions be inscribed in this
small part [of the brain], how can a town be engraved [in the brain] behold-
ing its measure, or a mountain beholding its largeness? Given that it was
impossible in the case of an eye when it was seeing shape by shape, one
after another, it is all the more impossible here, in the case of the percep-
tion of many different objects at the same time. How can different types of
perceived objects such as colours, shapes, hotness and coldness, hardness
and softness, [different] types of taste and smell be altogether? How does
one move in shortest time from the perception of something to perceiving
its opposite? [B] Also, if one’s perception is the occurrence of those qualities
in him, and the hot is that one in which there is hotness, and the cold is that
in which there is coldness, and the hard is that in which there is hardness,
and so on, then that spirit [which they claim to be the bearer of percep-
tion] hardens as stone, softens as air, becomes wet as water, becomes dry as
earth, burns as fire, and becomes cold as snow in the shortest time period.
Likewise it becomes sweet as honey and bitter as cactus, and [changes] in
terms of these states from one opposite to another [almost] without any time
distance (II.341.4-18).
First, Abū l-Barakāt again invokes the argument from magnitudes.
In the case of vision, representations of mountains must possess infor-
mation about the magnitude of the mountain in order for us to perceive
that magnitude at all. Given that we perceive representations alone,
information about the magnitude reverts on representations, and the
attributes of magnitude are applied to them. Now, the case of the com-
mon sense provides even bigger problems. The common sense must be
suitable for all shapes of varying magnitudes to fit into it. If we, how-
ever, describe perception through the common sense as the observation
of transferred images in the brain, these images must be as big as what
they represent. When I say “This mountain is so-and-so big”, the “moun-
tain” is an image in my brain, and hence “so-and-so big” applies to some-
thing in the brain. Obviously, this leads to problems.
It is quite central for understanding Abū l-Barakāt’s criticism of rep-
resentationalism that his representationalist opponent believes that the
representations that inhere in bodies are corporeal entities (see also sec-
tion four). So, in the second part (part B) of the argument, Abū l-Barakāt
has additional means to attack the idea that representations occur in
sense-organs. If the occurrence of a representation of heat entails a phys-
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iological change just like when heat occurs in anything else, then my
brain should become hot whenever I imagine fire. Again, the common
sense unites all possible perceptions and constantly jumps from one to
another. Hence, the problem holds for it a fortiori.
Summarising Abū l-Barakāt’s critique of representationalism, one
may trace the following logic. Whenever we perceive something, we have
an object of perception. In perceiving this object of perception, we ascribe
different attributes to this object. There are, however, some attributes
that just cannot be ascribed to representations if we define them as cor-
poreal simulacra, forms, images, and shapes that physically inhere in
our bodies. Saying that my eye becomes yellow when I see something
yellow and therefore I see the yellowness in the eye may not be such
a problem10. Saying the same about attributes, such as magnitudes,
distances, and some other corporeal qualities, is, however, quite prob-
lematic. Therefore, we must conclude that the object of perception to
which these attributes belong is something beyond our bodies. Hence,
the proper objects of perception are not representations but are rather
the objects themselves. Surprisingly, this argument does not apply to
outer sense-perception alone. Abū l-Barakāt quite explicitly denies the
claim that, in the case of imagining things, the imagined entities are cor-
poreal images that inhere in some brain ventricles. One may naturally
ask what and where the imagined entity is in this case. Abū l-Barakāt
resolves this issue by introducing the unitary subject of all perceptions,
the immaterial “self.”
3. THE FIRST-PERSON SUBJECT OF PERCEPTION:
THE IMMATERIAL SELF
Determining proper objects of perception as extramental objects
themselves is only the first step in Abū l-Barakāt’s criticism of his
predecessors’ theory of perception. He understands the proper determi-
nation of the subject of perception to be integral to his project as well.
Abū l-Barakāt wants to identify an immediate relation between one and
the same subject of perception, the immaterial “self,” and the multifar-
ious objects of perception – whether imagined or real. In opposition to
this immediate relation stands the traditional Aristotelian-Avicennian
theory of powers and faculties of soul (quwā) that dwell in corporeal
10 As argued in Richard Sorbaji, “Intentionality and physiological process: Aristotle’s
theory of sense-perception”, in M. Nussbaum and A. Rorty (eds), Essays on Aristotle’s
“De anima”, p. 195-226.
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organs. Hence, Abū l-Barakāt’s project demands a critical engagement
with this theory of powers.
As Jari Kaukua and Shlomo Pines have already noted, Abū l-Barakāt
develops Avicenna’s psychological theory. This theory states that we
have a direct intuitive grasp of our selves, which are identical to our
immaterial souls. The most famous example of this theory is the “fly-
ing man” argument: we can imagine ourselves not having awareness of
our corporeal organs and corresponding sense-perception. But we would
still be aware of our “selves”. Avicenna argues that this shows that our
soul – being identical to our “selves” – is incorporeal11. This immediate
access to the self plays an important role in Avicenna’s argument for the
unity of soul, as well. Although we perceive different objects with dif-
ferent faculties, these perceptions are necessarily united by one and the
same subject, the self, which says: “I have seen and I got angry12” (cf.
Salvation, 389.14). Kaukua has rightly pointed out that Abū l-Barakāt
develops this line of reasoning further, since he thinks that believing in
distinct faculties of the soul is incompatible with establishing the unity
of perception13. His programmatic statement goes as follows:
It suffices now to refute whoever talks about multiple powers and their
being distinct from each other to become verily aware from us ourselves
(min anfusinā) of the fact that it is [something] one and the same in us that
sees, hears, thinks, deliberates, calls to mind, remembers, wishes, dislikes,
is pleased, and is angry. Its self (ḏātuhū) and its thatness (anniyyatuhū) are
always one in all actions. There is no distinction in it. […] [318.15] If it is the
visual power that sees and it is something other than “me” – that is, other
than my soul and my self – then it is something other than me that sees,
not “I”. Yet I am aware, I see, and I certainly and truly know that it is me
who sees, hears, says, acts. If [the power] sees together with me and I [see]
together with it – each of us on its own, being independent from another in
terms of [this] act [of seeing] – then I do not require [the power for seeing].
It is however we who are aware and say that we see and not that something
else sees. And everything numerically different is something else. If [the
visual power] sees and transfers the seen to me, and then I see it through
11 Cf. Thérèse-Anne Druart, “The soul and body problem: Avicenna and Descartes”,
in T.-A. Druart (ed.), Arabic philosophy and the West: Continuity and interaction
(Washington, D.C.: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University,
1988), p. 27-49; Michael Marmura, “Avicenna’s ‘flying man’ in context”, Monist, 69
(1986), p. 383-95; Peter Adamson and Fedor Benevich, “The thought experimental
method: Avicenna’s flying man argument”, Journal of the American Philosophical
Association, 5 (2018), p. 1-18.
12 Quoted after Avicenna, Al-naǧāt min al-ġarq fī baḥr al-dalālāt, ed. M. Dānišpažūh
(Tehran: Dānišgāh-i Tihrān, 1985).
13 Kaukua, “Self, agent, soul”, p. 78-80.
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[this power] and in it, it also must be transferred to me that it occurred in
[that power] as well as that [the seen] was transferred from [that power] to
me. Then [this power] is receptive (qābila) and not active (fāʾila). It is the
subject of inherence for the vision. It is matter (hayūlā) and not an active
power. Or I am not aware of its act [of seeing]. There is then no difference
for me whether the perceived is transferred to me while [the power] is not
perceiving it, or it is transferred to me while the power is perceiving it, or I
perceive it in [the power] (II.318.6-23).
This passage begins with Abū l-Barakāt’s main argument. We intu-
itively know that we are the agents of our perceptive acts. The act of
seeing something is undoubtedly ascribed to the first person and not to
any third person, “something else.” This something else may be a power
of our soul or something different. Most importantly, it is not us. This is
Abū l-Barakāt’s central idea, to which he returns throughout his analy-
sis of perception (cf. II.314.7-9; II.319.14-15; II.319.20-21; II.333.15-16;
II.403.21-24; III.87.1-5). Given that he also accepts the logic of the “fly-
ing man” argument (II.306.2-5), his argument thus results in the claim
that we intuitively and certainly know that the immaterial soul is the
proper subject of perception rather than any faculty residing in the body
(notice the famous ambiguity of the Arabic language where “soul” and
“self” is just one and the same word nafs).
In light of the intuition of first person perceptive agency, the task of
the faculties of soul becomes rather unclear. Abū l-Barakāt ascribes to
his opponent the view that the faculties of soul are something numeri-
cally distinct from the immaterial self of the soul itself. These faculties,
residing in their corresponding sense-organs, are the primary subjects
of perception: when I see a red apple, the corporeal representation “red
apple” occurs in the eye and is perceived by the faculty of vision. Abū l-
Barakāt argues that the act of perception becomes doubled on this view.
First, the faculty sees something, and then it transfers the seen to the
“self” that sees it once again. In the second part of the passage, Abū l-
Barakāt raises problems for this account. He claims that, according to
this account, we would need to perceive the faculties’ acts of perception
as well, or at least the process of transferring the object of perception
to the inner eye of soul, since we perceive the representations located in
those faculties. Obviously, this is not the case. Whether a certain faculty
of soul perceives something is completely irrelevant for the perception of
soul itself. The soul only knows that there is an object of perception in
front of it, regardless of whether this object was transferred to it through
the sense-faculties.
Although it is not entirely clear towards the end of the passage which
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options Abū l-Barakāt identifies as false, one may suggest that his en-
tire argument is grounded in the denial of any active (fāʾil) involvement
of so-called “powers” that dwell in sense-organs. The result would be
that the transfer through the sense-organs is merely passive (qābil). For
instance, in his analysis of vision, Abū l-Barakāt not only denies the in-
tromissionist thesis but the extramissionist as well (that we see objects
through the rays that emit out of our eyes). According to Abū l-Barakāt’s
account of extramissionist theory, this theory would claim that there is
a faculty of vision in this ray that reaches out towards the seen object.
Abū l-Barakāt confronts this view with a dilemma. This power may be
numerically identical with our soul. Our soul then leaves our body, flies
over to the seen object, and returns. The only problem is that when soul
leaves body, the body dies. Alternatively, this faculty may be numerically
distinct from our soul. This however violates the first-person intuition
(II.328.26 – 329.4; II.332-33). Though Abū l-Barakāt does, in fact, en-
dorse the emission of rays, on his account, the ray “does not perceive
itself, nor is there anything in it that perceives. Rather it is [merely]
receptive (qābil), a bearer (ḥāmil) that arrives at the [real] perceiver
(II.326.4-5).”
More generally, Abū l-Barakāt’s agenda is to deny that sense-
perception involves the active participation of anything other than
the first-person subject. “Being active” means, in this case, to be the
subject of perception. This understanding of being active does not rule
out the possibility that sense-organs – that is, human body – pas-
sively participate in perception as well. This becomes central to Abū
l-Barakāt’s analysis of inner senses. We saw in the previous section that
Abū l-Barakāt denies that inner sensation, for instance imagination
or the common sense, involves the “impression” of material images in
the brain. Where then are the objects of imagination? The perceptual
objects of the outer senses are outside our minds in the world, but
imaginative things cannot be there. Abū l-Barakāt’s answer is that the
objects of inner sense are also directly related to the first-person sub-
jects. Moreover: “[Mental forms] are in our selves, which we clarified to
be non-corporeal substances (II.397.8-9);” “soul perceives [imaginative
forms] through itself and in itself, and [they] can fit in it (II.351.1-2).”
The last comment is fundamental to Abū l-Barakāt’s argumentation.
He previously argued that corporeal representations of large objects
cannot fit in the brain. They can however fit in the immaterial soul,
given that its immateriality permits everything to fit in it (II.352.11).
Why then do we have bodies for imagining things at all? Abū l-
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Barakāt initially presents a response that is rather detached from
the problem. He tells a general story about the connection (ʿilāqa) of
soul to body (II.344-45). He uses identifiably Platonic metaphorical
language. Soul is in love (ʿišq – II.351.14) with body, governs it (mulk –
II.345.3) and gets inspiration from it (ilhām – II.348.21). Being in love
with body, soul sinks into (munhamika) it and turns its full attention
(iltafat) to corporeal states (II.351.12-14). That is why body serves as
an instrument (āla – the word in Arabic that means both “instrument”
and “organ”) for sense-perception: both in the case of outer perception,
when soul turns its attention to eyes, and in the case of inner senses,
when soul imagines something by turning to a certain part of the brain.
Abū l-Barakāt insists that in neither case do we speak of perceiving an
impression in a corporeal organ, eye or brain. These are mere instru-
ments, which play a purely passive role: “Instruments / organs do not
participate in [soul’s] acts (II.348.24).”
The fact that sense-organs cannot be called the agents of perception
does not foreclose the possibility that they are there for epistemic in-
dividuation (taʿyīn) and specification (taḫṣīṣ) of perception. After soul
turns its attention to a certain sense-organ, it is this organ that de-
termines what soul perceives (cf. II.347.14; II.348.17-24; II.351.9). One
may wonder how this account of the individuation of sense-perception
does not necessitate active participation in perception. Apparently, Abū
l-Barakāt wants to distinguish between the act of perception as such and
the corporeal process that underlies it. The sense-organ may well be the
active principle of the second, but it cannot be the principle of the first.
In any case, and most importantly, one should understand that when
we imagine something by paying attention to certain part of the brain,
the imaged object is not in the brain. Rather it is in us – that is, in our
immaterial souls. Imagining something, the first-person subject turns
to itself by using the corporeal organ – the brain – as an instrument.
There is one traditional Aristotelian-Avicennian inner sense that
gives Abū l-Barakāt’s theory particular trouble. It is memory. In the
account attributed to his representationalist opponents, memory is a
certain corporeal vessel in which images are stored. When we want to
recall something we turn to this vessel and observe the image engraved
in it. We have, however, seen that Abū l-Barakāt denies that any image
can be impressed in the brain. All imagined things must inhere in the
soul itself: “Memorising (ḥifẓ) these forms and meanings is by soul in it
itself (ʿinda nafs fī ḏātihā), which is not too narrow [for them] to fit in it
(II.353.14-15).” This is, again, the argument from magnitudes that we
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saw in the second section. This however raises a natural concern: if our
memories directly belong to the soul how are we not constantly aware
of everything we learned? On this point, Abū l-Barakāt bites the bullet:
we are aware of it! He draws a distinction between awareness as such
and second-order awareness: awareness of awareness, or perception of
perception (idrāk al-idrāk). It is this second-order awareness that is
missing when we do not actively call memories to our minds.
Whatever is memorised is perceived by the one who remembers it al-
though he is not aware that he perceives it, since he is preoccupied with
something else and turns away from it. If he however perceives his percep-
tion by turning his attention to it, he is aware of it and recognises that he
perceives it. Memory is perception, yet the [active] grasping of forms is per-
ception together with the perception of perception (II.398.19-21).
The appeal to second-order awareness is among Abū l-Barakāt’s
favourite argumentative moves. As Kaukua has already noted, in his
refutation of different powers active in our bodies, Abū l-Barakāt also
confronts phenomena such as nutrition, or patients getting better
or worse while they are asleep. In neither case is the person – the
first-person subject, the immaterial soul – aware of what is happening
(II.320). Should there not, therefore, be a different agent, a distinct
power for these acts? Abū l-Barakāt denies this possibility. He argues
instead that we are, in fact, aware of these acts. We just lack an aware-
ness of our awareness (II.321). He compares this to the observation of
the motion of the sun through the sky. If one constantly looks at the sun,
one will not be aware of its motion, since our eyes follow its continuous
slow trajectory. One only sees that the sun has moved to another place
in the sky after turning away for some time and then looking at the sky
again (II.315). The same applies to nutrition, digestion and other acts.
We simply lack the awareness of ourselves being aware of these acts,
since they are so slow and continuous14.
Thus, memories are stored immediately in our souls, and we sim-
ply lack the second-order awareness of them. In the metaphysics part of
The reconsidered, Abū l-Barakāt once goes so far as to equate the phe-
nomenon of self-awareness with the way in which we remember things.
We are constantly aware of both, although we are usually distracted, and
we can turn back by realising the second-order awareness (III.92.5-8). I
think, though, that Abū l-Barakāt would still draw a certain distinction
between two cases. For self-awareness does not require any involvement
of body at all, as the “flying man” argument suggests. On the contrary,
14 Cf. Kaukua, “Self, agent, soul”, p. 81-87.
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as in the case of outer sense-perception and imagining, Abū l-Barakāt
acknowledges that the brain serves as the passive instrument for the
individuation of memory, not as a repository of engraved images but
rather as a means of calling something to mind (II.352-353).
With this, Abū l-Barakāt establishes a consistent doctrine of the
subject of any kind of psychic activity. The subject is the first-person
“I,” which is identical to the immaterial soul. Whenever we experi-
ence perception, an object presents itself to us. If the object involves
sense-perception – inner or outer – then the body also serves as an
instrument. The body, however, does not participate actively in per-
ception. Abū l-Barakāt denies that there are any distinct faculties that
dwell in sense-organs and that mediate the process of sense-perception.
4. ABŪ L-BARAKĀT
AND THE ARISTOTELIAN-AVICENNIAN TRADITION
We have seen so far how Abū l-Barakāt criticises representationalism
and the notion of certain psychic powers that dwell in corporeal organs
and perform acts of sense-perception. So far, however, the targets of Abū
l-Barakāt’s critiques have remained implicit. Although he mentions no
names in this context (except III.70.22), appeals to the faculties of souls,
the suggestion that some images occur in the sense-organs, and the par-
ticular analysis of concrete inner and outer senses leave no doubt that
the target of Abū l-Barakāt’s critique is the Avicennian theory of per-
ception. Further, through Avicenna this critique implicates the whole
Aristotelian tradition. Yet it remains to be considered whether Abū l-
Barakāt’s criticism of this tradition is historically fair.
At first glance, it may seem that all of the critical points that our
author raises against Avicenna and the Aristotelian tradition emerge
from a complete misunderstanding of their position. This is at least the
case if one compares his readings with contemporary interpretations
of Aristotle and Avicenna. Abū l-Barakāt ascribes to this tradition the
idea that the primary objects of perception are corporeal imprints in
our sense-organs. No modern interpreter of Aristotle would agree. First
of all, Abū l-Barakāt completely ignores the famous claim in De anima
II.12, 424 a 18 – 424 a 23 that we only perceive forms abstracted from
matter. On this basis, several interpreters have ascribed to Aristotle the
idea of intentionality: these forms would, in some way, be intentions that
bear information about extramental objects15. Thus, neither the percep-
15 Cf. e. g. Michael Burnyeat, “Is an Aristotelian philosophy of mind still credible? A
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tion of magnitudes nor of distances would cause any problems, contrary
to Abū l-Barakāt’s claims. As mentioned in the introduction, scholars of
Avicenna have ascribed the idea of intentionality to him as well, so he
also escapes Abū l-Barakāt’s criticism16.
Second, although some interpreters agree that the occurrence of rep-
resentations in the sense-organs – of which both Aristotle and Avicenna
certainly speak in their psychological works – involves physical change
(like the position of Richard Sorabji17), they would never say that those
corporeal representations are the objects of perception. Rather, percep-
tion consists in the occurrence of this image, the physiological process
that follows upon it, and subsequently the perception of the extramen-
tal object itself. That is why it has been argued that Aristotle was a direct
realist – no less than Abū l-Barakāt18. Although this interpretation has
not yet been taken up by the modern interpreters of Avicenna, it was
well known to medieval advocates of Avicenna’s position. For instance,
Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 1274) argues in his commentary on Avicenna’s
Pointers and reminders:
Perception is not just the occurrence of a form in the organ. Rather it is
its occurrence in the perceiver due to its occurrence in the organ. Therefore,
perception occurs neither in the common sense, nor in the intersection of the
two nerves [of eyes], but rather in the soul through both those organs due
to the occurrence of the form in the two aforementioned places [i.e. organs]
or some others (Commentary on Pointers and reminders, II.413.5-8)19.
If Ṭūsī is right in his interpretation of Avicenna, Abū l-Barakāt com-
pletely misses his target. Avicenna would never claim that the common
sense, as a distinct faculty, perceives something that is physically im-
printed in the corresponding sense-organ. Rather some formal repre-
sentation inheres in the organ and thereby the perceiver – that is, Abū
l-Barakāt’s favourite first-person subject – perceives the object itself. On
draft”, in M. Nussbaum and A. Rorty (eds.), Essays on Aristotle’s “De anima”, p. 15-
26.
16 The “form without matter” solution has also become very popular in the thirteenth
century Islamic East after Aṯīr al-Dīn al-Abharī (d. 1264); cf. Aṯīr al-Dīn al-Abharī,
Kašf al-ḥaqāʾiq fī taqrīr al-daqāʾiq, ed. by Hüseyin Sarıoğlu (Istanbul, 1998), p. 333,
l. 14-19.
17 Sorabji, “Intentionality and physiological process”.
18 Cf. Rapp, “Intentionalität und Phantasia”: given causal connection between the rep-
resentation in the eye and the object itself, Rapp denies that there is any place for
intentionality (because there can be no mistake in sense-perception). This amounts
to a very strong form of direct realism.
19 Quoted after Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūṣī, Šarḥ al-Išārāt, ed. by Ā. al-Āmulī, 3 vols (Qom:
Muʾassasa-yi būstān-i kitāb, 2004).
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this account, Avicenna’s theory seemingly does not differ from Abū l-
Barakāt’s: there is an epistemic relation between the first-person sub-
ject and the object of perception itself whose physiological counterpart
consists in the occurrence of some corporeal representation in the corre-
sponding sense-organ.
We have also seen that Abū l-Barakāt extensively criticises an al-
legedly Avicennian theory of psychic faculties. He argues at length
against the claims that they are distinct from the first-person subject of
perception, and that they actively participate in perception. On Ṭūsī’s
interpretation, Avicenna does not assent to either of these claims. Why
did Abū l-Barakāt decide that, according to Avicenna, the psychic facul-
ties must be numerically distinct from the immaterial soul? Moreover,
even if his reasoning about the active participation in perception applies
to inner senses to some extent, as Avicenna acknowledges that they are
active, Abū l-Barakāt completely ignores Avicenna’s frequent assertion
that outer sense-perception is purely passive20. Just as Abū l-Barakāt
wants it to be.
These apparent interpretive shortcomings may suggest a distinct, un-
derlying agenda in Abū l-Barakāt’s proofs of direct realism. Indeed, his
goal is not just to establish direct realism as such, but rather a certain
kind of direct realism to which neither Aristotle nor Avicenna would
agree. The reason is that Abū l-Barakāt wants to establish a form of
direct realism in which any kind of perceptual activity – whether it be
conception or inner or outer sense-perception – can arise between the
“self” of the perceiver and the object itself independent of whether the
“self” is embodied or not. That said, this doctrine of unified direct realism
is not compatible with mainstream Aristotelian direct realism. On the
contrary, assuming that the Aristotelian-Avicennian philosopher does
espouse direct realism, he still would never agree with Abū l-Barakāt’s
claim that sense-perception can happen without obtaining corporeal rep-
resentations in corporeal organs.
On this point, Abū l-Barakāt certainly does hit his target. There is
no doubt that Avicenna claims that only something corporeal can per-
ceive something corporeal. In his Salvation for instance, Avicenna ar-
gues that one can perceive something particular only through a corpo-
real organ (349.11). He takes it to be obvious that this must be the case
in instances of outer sense perception: “Some present existent body can
only be present and existent for some [other body] (350.5-6).” Nor can
something that is in a place present itself to something that is not in a
20 E. g. Avicenna, Healing, De anima, I.5, 43.16.
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place (350.8). Less obvious is his claim that one requires a body for inner
sense-perception. Avicenna’s thesis, however, is that “one cannot imag-
ine [anything] without an imaginative form being inscribed in the body
(350.13-14).” Avicenna argues for this conclusion at length. In short, he
suggests that we imagine two equal squares being juxtaposed with an-
other square in between them. Avicenna argues that we imagine the dif-
ferent positions of the two squares neither because of their nature, nor
because of some accidental state imposed (faraḍa) upon them, nor due to
a reference to any extramental squares. Thus, their distinct positioning
in our imagination can be only explained by the divisibility (inqisām) of
the underlying subject of the imagined picture. This subject is a corpo-
real organ or a sense-faculty that dwells in a divisible corporeal organ
(351-354). In the next chapter of the Salvation, Avicenna discusses the
opposite case: whatever is the subject of the conception of intelligibles
cannot be something corporeal. As in several other arguments, the idea
of divisibility plays a central role. This time, were a corporeal subject
of intellection divisible, this divisibility would render the inherent in-
telligible divisible as well. Yet Avicenna cannot accept this result, as he
maintains that intelligibles do not have measure (358.5-9).
Avicenna thus establishes that just as conception and sense-
perception differ in kind, so too they must be the activities of different
faculties. Only the immaterial mind can perceive universals. Only the
faculties of soul that dwell in corporeal organs can perceive sensible
particulars. These relationships hold when presented with reversed
priority, as well. If something is the object of mind’s awareness, it must
be universal. If it presents itself to a sense-faculty, however, it must
be a sensible particular. Abū l-Barakāt refutes this distinction. Two
chapter titles in the De anima of The reconsidered speak for themselves:
“That which perceives intelligibles and sensibles in us is one and the
same” (II.400.16-17) and “The refutation of their statement that the
intellect does not perceive particulars and sensibles (II.413.10).” In his
refutation, Abū l-Barakāt’s primarily targets Avicenna’s argument from
division:
It is on the basis of their argument that whatever is indivisible does not
inhere in the divisible, and the form of whatever is divisible does not inhere
in the indivisible, that they forbade that the perceiver of intelligible forms
is the same as the perceiver of sensibles (II.403.6-8).
Abū l-Barakāt’s counterargument is threefold. First, he suggests a
distinction between a real division (qism wuǧūdī) and division imposed
by the mind (qism farḍī). Abū l-Barakāt apparently maintains that, in
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his analysis of the squares example, Avicenna was too quick in reject-
ing the possibility that the difference between the squares is merely
mentally imposed (faraḍa). Abū l-Barakāt’s argument is that a mind-
imposed division in the object of perception does not entail the real divi-
sion of the subject of perception21 (II.402-403).
Abū l-Barakāt’s second line of argument addresses Avicenna’s claim
that something corporeal or in-place cannot be present in something
incorporeal or not-in-a-place. Abū l-Barakāt appeals to the example of
light. He takes the claim that light is not a body to be uncontroversial.
Yet light inheres in bodies and travels through them. It is accidentally in
place, and it is accidentally divided through bodies, but neither of these
attributions belongs to the light per se. So, light is not corporeal and
is not in-a-place but is present in something corporeal and in-a-place
(II.404.11-15; III.86.16-19).
Thirdly, Abū l-Barakāt turns Avicenna’s logic against him. First, if
only the corporeal can inhere in the corporeal, then it becomes unclear
for Abū l-Barakāt how Avicenna can claim that soul, being immaterial,
is in a body (III.86.20-21). Further, Abū l-Barakāt notices that positing
corporeal impressions in sense-organs does not really help Avicenna if
one accepts his reasoning. How can the immaterial soul perceive this
impression given that the impression is no less corporeal and sensible
than the extramental object itself was (II.414.24 – 415.1)?
Thus, Abū l-Barakāt refutes the Avicennian thesis that the per-
ception of sensibles requires the involvement of “a corporeal power by
which they mean that it subsists in the body” (II.338.4). Note that Abū
l-Barakāt insists that these powers are “corporeal” for his opponents,
meaning that they are necessarily connected to corresponding organs.
This is apparently the main reason why he ascribes to his opponent
the view that the faculties of soul must be numerically distinct. They
are corporeal, whereas soul is immaterial. Elsewhere, Abū l-Barakāt
rejects the possibility that the soul’s faculties are parts of soul, because
this would violate the unity of perception (II.353). If, however, these
faculties are just the soul itself (without partition), then it is the soul
which perceives sensibles. In this case, the mediation of corporeal sense-
organs and corresponding faculties becomes unnecessary (II.338.19-23).
This is precisely the position that Abū l-Barakāt himself maintains. It
21 Avicenna has a response to this solution in the Healing, De anima IV.3, 190.17 –
192.3: such imposing would be conceptual, but imagination does not involve anything
conceptual. I am grateful to Jari Kaukua for bringing Avicenna’s response to my
attention.
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is opposed to the view that sense-perception requires sense-organs. Avi-
cenna may come out as a direct realist on Ṭūsī’s interpretation, but he
would still insist that direct sense-perception requires having corporeal
organs as means for it. Abū l-Barakāt denies this: there can be a direct
acquaintance between the immaterial soul and extramental and mental
sensible particulars. While this acquaintance can be mediated through
the body, it need not always be so:
[The soul] turns its attention to whatever has been individuated and
specified through an organ not because [otherwise] it would be impossible
for it by its essence and nature [to perceive sensibles]. Rather [the reason for
its using body] is a connection of character and inspiration and its custom
(II.348.20-21).
Abū l-Barakāt argues that the soul – that is, the first-person subject –
uses body not because it otherwise would be unable to perceive sensibles.
There is nothing in the nature of the immaterial soul that would exclude
this, as we have seen that Abū l-Barakāt rejects Avicenna’s argument
from indivisibility. The only reason that soul uses body is the “connection
of inspiration,” which we saw already in the third section. Sense-organs
are thus merely responsible for individuation of sense-perception and
not for the whole process of sense-perception as such. This explains why
Abū l-Barakāt was so insistent that they play a completely passive role.
His intention was not to refute the idea that the faculties of soul that
dwell in organs are all active (which no one would actually maintain).
Rather he wanted to deny that these faculties can in any way be consid-
ered the subjects of perceptions. Abū l-Barakāt apparently believes that
Avicenna is forced to accept this view, given his argumentation in the
Salvation that corporeal faculties are necessary for sense-perception: if
they did not actively participate in perception one could eliminate them
and still have the perceptual relation between the immaterial subject
and the object of perception. Since one cannot eliminate them according
to Avicenna, they must be the agents of perception.
Hence Abū l-Barakāt’s main intervention is his claim that these fac-
ulties and corresponding organs are not necessary conditions for our
awareness of sensible particulars. In the end of the passage quoted in
the third section, Abū l-Barakāt argues that, since we do not perceive
that our organs perceive, it does not make any conscious difference to us
as perceivers whether the sense-organs were involved in perception. He
may be confusing the opaque and transparent contexts here (they may be
involved in sense-perception although we do not perceive it). Neverthe-
less, Abū l-Barakāt apparently thinks that this argument is sufficient
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to conclude that corporeal sense-organs and the corresponding faculties
of soul are not necessary conditions for sense-perception.
The arguments from magnitudes and distances that we saw in the
second section follow the same trajectory. Abū l-Barakāt elicits them
to refute the understanding of sense-perception that identifies the oc-
currence of corporeal images in sense-organs as a necessary condition
for sense-perception. In fact, Abū l-Barakāt takes these arguments even
further than he took the line of reasoning that focused on the subject of
perception. Indeed, he claims that, not only is the involvement of “cor-
poreal faculties” that acquire inherent corporeal images not necessary,
but it is impossible. Only the immaterial soul – the first-person subject –
can accommodate all imaginable and sensible particulars:
It has been verified and established many times in different and similar
ways of expressing it that the perceiver of intelligibles is the same as the
perceiver of sensibles and that the perceiver of concrete existents is the same
as the perceiver of mental objects in us (II.416.6-8).
5. UNIFIED DIRECT REALISM
The outcome of Abū l-Barakāt’s analysis of perception may be now
summarised. First, he rules out possible candidates and finally identifies
the proper object of perception. Based on his argument from magnitudes
and distances, the proper object of perception cannot be a representation
that occurs in sense-organs. Rather, the proper object of perception is the
object itself. Second, Abū l-Barakāt establishes the proper subject for
all forms of perception. On the basis of the first-person awareness argu-
ment, he argues that there is only one, unified subject for all forms of per-
ceptions, which he calls the first-person immaterial “self.” To strengthen
his claim, Abū l-Barakāt then anticipates a possible counter-argument
from the Aristotelian-Avicennian philosopher, which is the claim that
the perception of material particulars cannot be obtained without the
involvement of sense-organs. Abū l-Barakāt counters this claim by first
acceding that sense-organs may indeed be involved in sense-perception;
but this fact in itself does not automatically constitute a necessary con-
dition for sense-perception. As a result, Abū l-Barakāt shows that they
play no “active” role in sense-perception. With these two steps – namely,
establishing the proper object and subject of perception – Abū l-Barakāt
develops what I have called in this essay “unified direct realism.” The
main tenet of this form of unified direct realism is that there is no fun-
damental difference between conception and sense-perception. This is
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due to the fact that, according to Abū l-Barakāt, in both cases of cogni-
tive activity we are dealing with a single process of epistemic connection
between one and the same subject of cognition (the immaterial “self”) on
the one hand and different objects on the other, regardless of whether
these objects are immaterial intelligibles, material imaginative forms,
or sensible extramental particulars. To this Abū l-Barakāt adds that all
epistemic activities have the same structure. Abū l-Barakāt calls it a
mere “encounter” (laqāʾ) between two objects themselves:
If we turn to our minds, [inspecting] this general idea that perception is
complete and realised through the encounter between the perceiver himself
and object itself (laqāʾ al-ḏāt al-mudrika li-l-ḏāt allātī tadrukuhū), we find
[this idea] to be correct (II.325.11-13).
“Encounter” thus is the notion upon which unified direct realism re-
lies. By encountering the subject of perception basically “meets” the ob-
ject of perception, like one man on the street meeting the other. Encoun-
tering is a sufficient condition for perception. Later, Abū l-Barakāt of-
fers some linguistic analysis of the Arabic notion of perception (idrāk).
It originally means that something or someone reaches or comes across
something or someone else, just like when I go to a meeting and en-
counter someone there. Abū l-Barakāt does not see any significant dif-
ference between this general notion of idrāk and the specific case when
the encountered object is a perceived object (II.394.8-17). For in both
cases someone reaches something: idrāk understood as sense-perception
is merely a special kind of that “reaching.”
On this basis Abū l-Barakāt concludes that perception is a relational
state (ḥāla iḍāfiyya), analogous to the way in which I encounter some-
one and we relate to each other as the one who was met and the one
who met (II.323.14-15). This idea will become crucial in Abū l-Barakāt’s
solution to the problem of God’s knowledge of perishing sensible partic-
ulars. Indeed, it will prove no less crucial than the aforementioned refu-
tation of Avicenna’s claim that one needs to be corporeal (which God is
not) in order to perceive sensibles22 (III.83.3-4). This leads us to another
related question, namely, whether Abū l-Barakāt might have thought
that God – and also perhaps superlunary intellects – is the only case
where an immaterial entity actually happens to be epistemically related
to sensible particulars, or whether he thought that the human intellect
could also know in this way. We have seen in the previous section that
22 Fedor Benevich, “God’s knowledge of particulars: Avicenna, kalām, and the post-
Avicennian synthesis”, Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales, 76 (1),
2019, p. 1-47.
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Abū l-Barakāt definitely does not exclude this option in the case of hu-
man intellects even though he acknowledges that they factually happen
to perceive sensibles through the passive involvement of sense-organs.
That said, how humans could perceive sensibles without corporeal or-
gans remains an open question23.
Thus, Abū l-Barakāt believes that all epistemic activity proceeds in
the same way: perception is a relation between the first-person subject,
the immaterial “self”, and any kind of objects of perception. His doctrine
of unified direct realism is significantly different from the traditional
tenets of Aristotelian-Avicennian epistemology. On the one hand, Aristo-
tle might have agreed that conception and sense-perception are alike in
a certain sense (cf. De anima III.4, 429 a 13-17). Furthermore, Avicenna
can also be interpreted as holding to the idea that all epistemic activity
has the same basic structure, since for him all knowledge is based on
an impression (inṭibāʿ) of perceptual objects in the perceiver. This is in
fact how the later tradition understood him. Nevertheless, it would be
misleading to say that Aristotle or Avicenna’s idea of “knowledge” (in the
broad sense) having the same epistemic structure is equivalent to Abū
l-Barakāt’s unified direct realism. The reason is that, as we have seen
in the previous section, they require sense-organs to mediate in cases of
sense-perception. While conception for them is an immediate epistemic
connection between the first-person immaterial self and the intelligible
23 There are two further problems in Abū l-Barakāt’s account for which he never pro-
poses a solution, so far as I can see. The first is whether Abū l-Barakāt would ac-
cept that we can see with our ears or hear with our eyes, since our reliance on the
correspondent organs of perception is not necessary according to him. The second
problem is whether Abū l-Barakāt implies that we can see without eyes and hear
without ears at all. Rather speculatively, I suggest that Abū l-Barakāt would deny
that we can see with our ears. The essence of ears prevents us from seeing through
them. If the soul turns its attention to a corporeal organ, in the sense of “a connec-
tion of inspiration” as described in the previous sections, it can only perform those
activities that are compatible with the essence of the organ. Nor can the soul hear
and see without ears and eyes if we understand hearing and seeing as processes
which happen through ears and eyes respectively. Abū l-Barakāt’s idea only is that
we can acquire all information about particular individuals (which we normally ac-
quire through eyes and ears) even without eyes and ears. Abū l-Barakāt means to
grant that incorporeal substances can fully cognise sensible individuals, even if this
cognition cannot be called seeing or hearing in the proper sense. I am grateful both
for these questions and the discussion of responses to them to the participants of the
“Theories of cognition in the Aristotelian tradition” conference, which happened in
October 2019 in the University of Notre Dame London Global Gateway; especially
to Colin King, Christopher Shields, Philip Neri Reese, Dominik Perler, and Klaus
Corcilius.
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S095742392000003X
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Edinburgh, on 19 Oct 2021 at 13:47:03, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
254 FEDOR BENEVICH
that is impressed on it, sense-perception requires mediation. For them,
this mediation can be made through sense-organs and sense-faculties
such that the first-person subject of perception is then connected to the
object of perception. This mediation is necessary, furthermore, even in
the case of inner perceptions such as imagination. This was for instance
the main point of Abū l-Barakāt’s criticism in the passage quoted at the
end of the first section. We have seen there that he ascribes to his oppo-
nents a distinction between two cases: first, when one perceives sensi-
bles, one requires the inscription and impression of representations in
sense-organs; second, when one perceives immaterial intelligibles, one is
entitled to talk of direct immediate perception (II.324.18 – 325.11). Abū
l-Barakāt’s own unified epistemology denies that there is any difference
between conception and sense-perception.
Nor should one reduce Abū l-Barakāt’s unified direct realism as a
mere statement of the unity of the subject of perception. As I briefly
mentioned in the third section, and as we have seen in Ṭūsī’s interpre-
tation in the fourth section, Avicenna might have been entirely willing
to accept that the subject of all perceptions is one and the same: namely,
the first-person “self” – the same one who feels anger is the same one who
sees. Avicenna’s idea here is however very different from Abū l-Barakāt’s
position that the perceiver of intelligibles is the same as the perceiver
of sensibles. The reason is that Avicenna’s statement of the unity of
the subject of perception is still compatible with the idea that sense-
perception requires the involvement of sense-faculties in sense-organs.
Abū l-Barakāt’s thesis however is incompatible with that requirement.
In a slightly more generalising way I would suggest the following in-
terpretation of Abū l-Barakāt’s criticism of Avicenna’s position. Basi-
cally, he confronts Avicenna with two options. If Avicenna accepts that
the structure of conception and sense-perception is the same (in both
cases the object of perception is impressed in the subject) he cannot hold
the unity of the perceptual subject anymore. For while representations
of sensible objects are impressed in a sense-faculty that dwells in a cor-
poreal organ, intelligibles however, are impressed in the immaterial in-
tellect directly. If however Avicenna instead wants to insist on the unity
of the subject of perception, he cannot argue that conception and sense-
perception are similar epistemological processes. While conception is the
impression of intelligibles in the immaterial “self”, sense-perception is
the impression of a representation in something other than the imma-
terial “self”, namely a sense-faculty in a sense-organ. The first process
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is immediate, the second one is mediated24.
One might, furthermore, raise a number of doubts against Abū l-
Barakāt’s unified direct realism. First, unified epistemology somewhat
undermines the difference between the real and the ideal. Is there a
way for a unified direct realist to account for the difference between that
which is dependent on our minds (intelligibles and imaginative forms)
and the mind-independent sensible particulars, given that both the sub-
ject of their perception and the way we perceive them is one and the
same? Abū l-Barakāt seemingly makes his ground even shakier when
he aligns the notion of perception with the notion of existence (wuǧūd):
If someone perceives something through one of his senses – such as vi-
sion, hearing, smell, taste, and touch – and he recognises it, and recognises
that he has perceived it, he says about that thing that it is existent. By its
being existent I do not mean that it is perceived, but rather that it is such
that it can be perceived both before it has been perceived as well as after it,
and before anyone else perceived it and after it. For something is in itself
such that it can be perceived. Then, someone perceives it. Its being such is
precisely what one calls existence (III.20.17-22).
Abū l-Barakāt shows in this passage how closely he sees the notions of
perception and existence. Given that we perceive the object in itself, exis-
tence may be defined as something’s being such that it can be perceived.
In this passage, Abū l-Barakāt also attempts to foreclose a possible mis-
understanding of his claim. This misunderstanding would ascribe a form
of idealism to Abū l-Barakāt, suggesting that his claim that we perceive
objects themselves, results in the conclusion that objects themselves only
exist whenever we perceive them. Abū l-Barakāt roundly rejects this in-
ference. Existence is not tantamount to being perceived. Existence is
tantamount to being such that it can be perceived. Something exists and
is such independently from its actually being perceived by anyone.
Although Abū l-Barakāt avoids falling into idealism, one may still
wonder how he can account for subjective errors, given his unified di-
rect realism. The strong side of Avicenna’s position, that one requires
sense-faculties in sense-organs for sense-perception, is that one could
account for errors and misrepresentations by ascribing them to the ac-
tive role of sense-faculties. For example, let there be a red apple in front
of me. I however perceive it to be blue because my sense-faculty, residing
24 Avicenna’s own way to grant the unity of perception is more nuanced than this. He
uses the Neoplatonic theory of emanation: corporeal faculties emanate from the im-
material self (as procession); then they revert to it and transfer the acquired sensible
information (as return) (cf. Healing, De anima, V.7, esp. 254.12).
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S095742392000003X
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Edinburgh, on 19 Oct 2021 at 13:47:03, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
256 FEDOR BENEVICH
in a damaged sense-organ, actively misrepresents the red apple as blue
and presents this false image to my inner first-person subject of per-
ception. But this account is entirely wrong for Abū l-Barakāt. For him,
sense-faculties in sense-organs are not necessary conditions for sense-
perception; as such, they cannot be used to explain the mistakes we make
when conceiving and perceiving. Though Abū l-Barakāt would allow that
our sense-organs specify sense-perception, they are merely passive prin-
ciples. The red apple may appear blue to me, but there is no fault of the
subject of perception in it, since the process is purely automatic. In fact,
I did perceive the red apple; it only looked blue to me (as opposed to
the theory that states that I actively misconceived the red-apple-data of
sense-perceptions as blue apple). This might look very similar to the pre-
vious case in Avicenna. There is however a significant difference, which
can be made evident on the basis of a more radical case: the perception
of sensibles without the interference of bodies. We have seen that Abū
l-Barakāt, as opposed to Avicenna, believes that this kind of perception
is possible. But how can one account for subjective errors in this case?
Does Abū l-Barakāt think that the immaterial perceiver can never make
subjective mistakes?
We should not, however, worry that Abū l-Barakāt leaves too little
space for the subjective. In his solution to this problem, he draws a dis-
tinction between perception and recognition (maʿrifa). In his descrip-
tion of the states of knowledge acquisition, Abū l-Barakāt distinguishes
seven levels:
(1) Mere awareness (šuʿūr) of something.
(2) Establishing (istiṯbāt) it in the mind while being aware that one
is aware of something (remember the importance of the second-order
awareness for Abū l-Barakāt). This is called conceptualisation / image-
formation (taṣawwur).
(3) Learning to understand (fahm) the meaning of a concept when
someone refers to it with a linguistic expression (lafẓ).
(4) Memorising (hafẓ) the learned idea.
(5) Recognition (maʿrifa), which means that I see some object and
recognise in it certain ideas that I have previously learned and memo-
rised25.
25 Note that maʿrifa traditionally has a broader meaning that includes both “cognition”
and “knowledge”. Abū l-Barakāt however insists on the idea of repetition in maʿrifa
in this passage, and hence it should only be translated as “recognition” when found
in Abū l-Barakāt’s writings. The idea of recognition plays a central role already in
Avicenna’s solution to Meno’s paradox in his Healing, Demonstration I.6 (Al-šifāʾ, Al-
manṭiq, Al-burhān, ed. by A. ʿAfīfī, Cairo, al-Maṭbaʿa al-amīriyya, 1952, p. 75 l. 9 –
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(6) Knowledge (ʿilm), which entails providing a statement that can
either correspond (muwāfiqa) or not correspond to the opinion of some-
one else or to the reality of the extramental object. If it does correspond,
it is called truth (ṣidq), if it does not – falsehood (kaḏb).
(7) Assent (taṣdīq) or negative assent (takḏīb), which means that
someone with an idea either claims that it corresponds to the extramen-
tal or that it does not (cf. II.394-95).
The sequence of the first four stages reinforces my suggestion that
the direct realism of Abū l-Barakāt is objective in nature. There is no
place for a subjective element in these four stages. One becomes aware
of something, becomes aware that one is aware of it and then learns the
perceived by heart, together with a word that designates it. Here we are
dealing with perception alone, as memorisation is an inner sense of per-
ception. The subjective, however, appears in the fifth stage: recognition.
It is properly up to me whether I correctly identify some new perceived
object as the red apple I have seen before, as another red apple, or as
a peach. This is why Abū l-Barakāt introduces the notions of truth and
falsehood only after he establishes recognition. If I recognise something
correctly, my knowledge is true. If I do not, then it is not.
Abū l-Barakāt thus denies any dualism on the level of perception.
We perceive things as they are, with some individuation through sense-
organs. Even if a red apple appears blue to me, the blue apple is still a
piece of empirical data that is not anyhow contaminated by the interfer-
ence of my subjective point of view. There is however another dualism.
The dualism between a personal idea, an image saved in the mind, and
the object to which this idea supposedly corresponds. This dualism is a
way for Abū l-Barakāt to explain the correlation between the subjective
and objective. When I see a red apple for the first time I directly learn
the empirical data. When I however see the red apple for the second
time, I compare the new empirical data with the saved image and may
err in identifying it as red apple. Unfortunately, Abū l-Barakāt does not
clarify possible reasons for a failure of recognition: if I directly learned
the empirical data for “red apple” from one red apple, and I directly
p. 76 l. 13). Avicenna distinguishes between the stage of learning something without
intending it (cf. Abū l-Barakāt’s stages 1-4) and the intentional recognition of some-
thing as corresponding to the previous knowledge of it (cf. Abū l-Barakāt’s stage 5;
cf. Healing, Demonstration I.3, 58.10-18 on recognition in sense-perception). I am
grateful to the anonymous reviewer for bringing my attention to this probable his-
torical background of Abū l-Barakāt’s seven levels. On Avicenna’s solution of Meno’s
paradox see Michael Marmura, “Avicenna on Meno’s paradox: On ‘apprehending’ un-
known things through known things”, Medieval studies, 71 (2009), p. 47-62.
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perceive another red apple when I intend to subsume it under the same
“red apple” concept, why would I recognise the other red apple as a blue
apple? Abū l-Barakāt’s theory of recognition makes room for subjective
mistakes but it does not explain where they come from26. Another prob-
lem concerns how other people can know the objects of my inner senses.
Abū l-Barakāt argues that I can explain with words what I have on my
mind to another person. This other person can then find a correspond-
ing mental form in himself and recognise this form as the same as that
which I described. Abū l-Barakāt – quite intuitively – insists that the
interlocutor only finds a corresponding idea in his mind. Therefore, the
perception of something imaginative – mental forms – differs from the
perception of something extramental because, in the latter case, the in-
terlocutor perceives the same extramental object that I do (II.322.17 –
323.6). However, given all of his arguments against representational-
ism, how can Abū l-Barakāt avoid the idea that the interlocutor must
perceive precisely the same object that is in my mind? If he does not,
then he has not perceived what I mean, as Abū l-Barakāt argued above
in the context of perception in general. Unfortunately, Abū l-Barakāt
does not address this problem.
6. CONCLUSION
So far, I have argued that Abū l-Barakāt developed an episte-
mological theory that went beyond the boundaries of the traditional
Aristotelian-Avicennian framework. Although one may equally as-
cribe direct realism to Avicenna and the Aristotelian tradition, Abū
l-Barakāt’s unified direct realism is certainly new to the tradition. The
unified direct realism involves three claims:
1. the proper objects of perception are things in themselves
2. the unity of the perceiver of intelligibles and sensibles
3. the unity of the process by which intelligibles and sensibles are
perceived
I cannot claim to be the first to recognise the innovative character of
Abū l-Barakāt’s unified epistemology. Although Abū l-Barakāt’s impor-
tance has been largely neglected in contemporary scholarship, medieval
26 I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer for bringing my attention to this shortcom-
ing in Abū l-Barakāt’s theory.
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scholars of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries Islamic east were very
well aware of it. We may find the following historical report in the Doubts
on Avicenna’s Pointers and reminders of Šaraf al-Dīn al-Masʿūdī, who
succeeded Abū l-Barakāt by two generations (d. before 1204):
Saying that the perceiver is divided into the corporeal one which per-
ceives sensibles only and the incorporeal one which perceives the intelligi-
bles only is wide-spread and accepted, and most people agree on this. No-
body disagreed with them apart from the eminent of our time whom God
– may He be exalted – distinguished by superiority in investigation and in-
quiry: this is the author of The reconsidered, [Abū l-Barakāt al-Baġdādī],
may God give thanks to him for his efforts and give him a great reward! If
you follow the pattern of correct judgement, leave aside [personal] inclina-
tions and solidarity, and are not satisfied with doctrines according simply
to the way they sound, then you will know that the true is that which [Abū
l-Barakāt] believed27 (215.8-13).
Masʿūdī’s historical observation aligns with my analysis in section
five: Abū l-Barakāt’s opposed the Avicennian tradition by rejecting a dis-
tinction between two subjects of perceptions for intelligibles and sensi-
bles. Masʿūdī completely agrees with Abū l-Barakāt in what follows.
Reports of Abū l-Barakāt’s radical position were not always so ap-
proving as Masʿūdī’s. The following account appears in the treatise Im-
portant points and useful remarks, whose authorship has not yet been
identified:
Do not listen to what the Sheikh of the Jews [Abū l-Barakāt al-
Baġdādī28] says, that the perceiver of these [corporeal phenomena] is the
soul itself without any organ. For, first, no particular corporeal form can
be impressed in the soul, but only universal intellectual form according
to what will shortly be explained to you. Also, we observe the falling rain
as lines and one fire when it is quickly rotated, but we do not perceive
with senses anything that does not exist extramentally; hence it remains
that it is internal. Its existence is not in the soul, since it requires [some]
distinction from it and since no particular form can occur to it. Therefore,
it remains that it is in some other internal faculty, which is called the
common sense (154.9-14)29.
Without devoting much attention to the details of Important points’
27 Quoted after Šaraf al-Dīn al-Masʿūdī, Al-mabāḥiṯ wa-l-šukūk ʿalā kitāb al-Išārāt,
ed. by Ayman Shihadeh (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2016).
28 For identification of the Sheikh of the Jews with Abū l-Barakāt see Yahya Michot,
“Al-nukat wa-l-fawāʾid: An important summa of Avicennian falsafa”, in P. Adamson
(ed.), Classical Arabic philosophy: Sources and reception (London-Turin: Warburg
Institute – Nino Aragno, 2007).
29 Quoted after “Al-nukat wa-l-fawāʾid”, MS Feyzullah 1217.
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critique of Abū l-Barakāt, one may notice that its author generally is not
content with the claim that one can perceive sensibles directly without
essential involvement of any sense-organ. We saw in the fourth section
that Abū l-Barakāt’s position on this point is indeed very radical.
Probably the first author to acknowledge the importance of Abū l-
Barakāt’s theory by criticising it was his young contemporary ʿUmār
b. Sahlān al-Sāwī (d. 1145). In his treatise The way to sanctification
he claims to have been asked by certain colleagues to react to Abū l-
Barakāt’s theory of God’s knowledge of particulars (121). Sāwī recog-
nises that this theory is heavily based on Abū l-Barakāt’s innovative
epistemology. This systematical background forces the author of The
way to sanctification to spend a major part of his treatise (136-46) ar-
guing against the following view:
All perceptions pertain to the soul alone. There is no visual power in the
eye, nor any hearing power in the ear, nor smelling power in the nose, nor
tasting power in the tongue, nor any touching power in the whole body of
man, such that it would distinguish between coldness and hotness, wetness
and dryness, hardness and softness, roughness and smoothness. Rather, all
these perceptions pertain to the soul itself30 (137.13-16).
In the rest of this section, Sāwī presents Abū l-Barakāt’s arguments
from distances and magnitudes, as well as the first-person intuition, and
attempts to give Avicennian responses to them. In general, the argu-
ment from the perception of magnitudes becomes the hallmark of Abū
l-Barakāt’s theory of perception for following centuries. In the end of
the thirteenth century Saʿīd al-Yamānī al-Tustarī (d. 1306) ascribes the
following line of reasoning to Abū l-Barakāt in his treatise The debates
between Rāzī and Ṭūsī:
When the author of The reconsidered [understood] the necessity of [posit-
ing] the impression in perception, yet he established that the impression of
the large in the small is impossible, he could not but say that the perceiver of
everything perceived is the soul. It [perceives] without the mediation of or-
gans. Rather those external and internal organs are not mediators in terms
of perception but [only] in terms of the specification of something perceived
as opposed to the other. The perceiver is the soul without organs. He claimed
that the perceived is impressed in the soul itself, so that no impression of
the large in the small must follow31 (fol. 44r.14-17).
30 Quoted after ʿUmar b. Sahlān al-Sāwī, “Nahǧ al-taqdīs”, in G. Dadkhah and M.
Karimi Zanjani Asl (eds), Three logical and philosophical treatises (Bonn: Goethe
und Hafis, 2013), p. 119-54.
31 Quoted after Saʾid al-Yamānī al-Tustarī, Kitāb al-muḥākamāt bayna Naṣīr al-Dīn
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Tustarī also acknowledges Abū l-Barakāt’s denial of the mediatory
role of sense-organs. He nicely describes the subtle difference between
the involvement of sense-organs as necessary conditions (Avicenna’s
position) and their merely supplemental role as “specifiers” in Abū
l-Barakāt. That said, Tustarī’s analysis does differ from mine. He
thinks that Abū l-Barakāt uses the magnitudes argument in order to
establish that the impressions of all perceived things inhere directly in
the soul. Conversely, on my interpretation this reasoning only applies
to intellection and inner sense-perception, such as imagination. As for
outer sense-perception, we perceive things without any impressions
at all, that is, through having a direct epistemic relation between the
first-person subject of perception and the mind-independent object
itself.
These passages present clear evidence that Abū l-Barakāt’s theory of
perception was acknowledged, both by his contemporaries and scholars
in subsequent centuries, to be an important contribution and, indeed, a
breakthrough in the history of epistemology. It necessitated a response,
either positive or negative. While these accounts tend to emphasise the
role of the unity of the perceiver in Abū l-Barakāt’s theory, we have seen
in section five that this unity of perceiver is interwoven with his idea of
the unity of the process of perceiving. That is, whoever perceives intel-
ligibles is identical to the one who perceives sensibles because, for Abū
l-Barakāt, the same process is involved in knowing either intelligibles or
sensibles. Otherwise his account would not differ at all from Avicenna’s
position who also accepted to an extent the unity of the subject of per-
ception.
In respect to Abū l-Barakāt’s idea of the unity of process, I would
like to advance a hypothesis in the conclusion of this paper that
marks the influence of Abū l-Barakāt’s unified epistemology in the
later tradition. One can see for instance that Abū l-Barakāt’s epis-
temology presages two further attempts of construing epistemolog-
ical theories in the 12th century. These attempts were undertaken
by the two most influential post-Avicennian philosophers: Faḫr al-
Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1210) and Šihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī (d. 1191).
It suffices to note that Rāzī – as has been already noticed by Hei-
drun Eichner – devotes significant attention to showing that knowl-
edge is not “the occurrence of the perceived in the perceiver” –
wa-l-imām Faḫr al-Dīn under the title Kitāb al-muḥākamāt bayna šurrāḥ al-Išārāt,
MS Laleli 2551.
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using, among others, Abū l-Barakāt’s arguments from distances
and magnitudes – but is rather a relation (iḍāfa) between the per-
ceiver and the perceived32. Such a relation holds between the perceiver
– that is, the first-person subject of perception and not any additional
psychic faculty33 – and the perceived regardless of what the perceived is.
In his Commentary on Avicenna’s Pointer and reminders, Rāzī concludes
after extensive dialectical reasoning:
The truth for us is that perception does not mean the occurrence of that
form alone; rather it means a relational state which obtains either between
the intellectual capacity and the quiddity of the form which exists in the in-
tellect, or between the former and the concrete thing realised extramentally
(II.226.9-11).
Although Rāzī accepts that the occurrence of a form may be a part of
the process of perception, his central claim is that it is not an essential
part of it. Like Abū l-Barakāt, Rāzī thinks that the core of any percep-
tion consists in a “relational state” to the perceived object. While this
epistemic relation may be either to intelligibles or to sensibles, the im-
portant point is that the relation is one and the same even while the
objects of knowledge differ in kind.
As for Suhrawardī, whose epistemology was recently addressed by
Heidrun Eichner and Jari Kaukua34, his theory that knowledge is
mere “presence” (ḫuḍūr) of the perceived to the perceiver – regardless
of whether it is a universal or particular – could also be construed as
being indebted to Abū l-Barakāt’s epistemological unified direct real-
ism as well. As his detailed analysis in the Paths and havens35 makes
particularly clear, the main aim of Suhrawardī’s theory of “knowledge
32 Cf. Heidrun Eichner, “ ‘Knowledge by presence’, apperception and the mind-body
relationship: Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and al-Suhrawardī as representatives and pre-
cursors of a thirteenth-century discussion”, in Peter Adamson (ed.), In the age of
Averroes: Arabic philosophy in the sixth / twelfth century (London: Warburg Insti-
tute, 2011), p. 117-40.
33 Rāzī specifically focuses on the unity of the subject of conception and sensation in
the Commentary on Pointers and reminders, II.222.6-13 (quoted after Faḫr al-Dīn al-
Rāzī, Šarḥ al-Išārāt, ed. ʿA. Naǧāfzāda, 2 vol., Tehran, Anǧuman-i Āṯār wa Mafāḫir-i
Farhangī, 2005).
34 Eichner, “Knowledge by presence”, and Jari Kaukua, “Suhrawardī’s knoweldge as
presence in context”, in Sylvia Akar, Jaakko Hämeen-Antilla, and Inka Nokso-
Koivisto (ed.), Travelling through time: Essays in honour of Kaj Öhrnberg (Helsinki:
Finnish Oriental Society, 2013), p. 309-24.
35 Quoted after Šihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī, Al-mašāriʿ wa-l-mutāraḥāt, ed. by H.
Corbin, Opera metaphysica et mystica, vol. 1 (Istanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1952),
p. 194-505.
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by presence” or “illumination” (išrāq) is to show that there must be
some knowledge – ascribed to the first-person subject, as it was in Abū
l-Barakāt – that does not manifest through the occurrence of a form36
(485.13). Among other things, Suhrawardī argues for this by appealing
to Abū l-Barakāt’s argument from magnitudes (486.1-17). Suhrawardī’s
position is then summarised as follows:
Everything that soul perceives must be divided into [following] divisions:
[1] As for universals, they are perceived through the presence of a form
which is impressed in the essence of [the soul]; [2] As for particulars, they
are perceived either through the presence of themselves and illumination
of the soul, or through the occurrence of something in something which is
present to the soul and about which the soul has illumination. So, soul per-
ceives particulars either through their presence to it or through the pres-
ence of something which is present to it, such as imaginative forms. If there
ought to be [some] investigation of this, we reserve it only for those who be-
long to the illumination. The whole can be summarised as that [whatever
is known] is not hidden from [the soul] (487.12-17).
Suhrawardī accepts that in some cases perception involves the im-
pression of a form in the perceiver. This is the case when one concep-
tualises intelligibles and imaginative forms. In the case of extramental
particulars, however, sensibles directly present themselves to the first-
person subject of perception. Suhrawardī agrees with Abū l-Barakāt
that the perception of mind-independent sensibles is not based on repre-
sentations in sense-organs. That said, he disagrees with Abū l-Barakāt
in the case of imagination: here he allows that images inhere in sense
organs. When I imagine a red apple, the image of a red apple is im-
pressed in the sense-organ. This organ in itself, as a concrete particular,
is directly present to the first-person subject of perception. This theory
can only hold if Suhrawardī accepts Abū l-Barakāt’s suggestion that an
immaterial perceiver can have direct acquaintance with a material sen-
sible. It might be an extramental red apple or it might the sense-organ
in which the image of a red apple resides. Most importantly, Suhrawardī
appears to follow Abū l-Barakāt’s unified direct realism: the procedure of
conception is the same as the procedure of sensation; furthermore, they
have one and the same subject of perception. As a final word, I would ten-
tatively suggest that both Rāzī’s “relational state” and Suhrawardī’s “il-
lumination” or “presence” are expressions of unified direct realism; they
echo Abū l-Barakāt’s idea of a direct encounter between a first-person
subject of perception and any given perceived object. This hypothesis,
36 Cf. Jari Kaukua, “Suhrawardī’s knoweldge as presence”.
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of course, requires further analysis of Rāzī and Suhrawardī’s respective
epistemologies before being accepted.
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